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Abstract
In this note, we consider a perennial problem in single-person choice
theory, that is, characterizing choice under uncertainty. In particular, we
consider a hypothesis put forward by Joseph Stiglitz (2005), suggesting
that median-maximing behavior may be optimal under certain circum-
stances, and consider how it might best be rationalized within choice
theory as it is currently conceived. As is well known, median-maximizing
behavior is not generally optimal in the classical VNM framework. Our
main result is that it is possible to rationalize the Stiglitz hypothesis in
the Machina-Schmeidler (1992) framework of probabilistic sophistication.
JEL classification code: D81
1 Introduction and Motivation
A perennial problem in single-person choice theory, variously known as util-
ity theory or decision theory, concerns characterizing choice under uncertainty.
Here, there is a gulf between results that have been established at the fron-
tiers of economic theory, and the models that are generally deployed in applied
theoretical work in fields such as, inter alia, industrial organization, economic
development, and finance. Most applications still employ a version of the classi-
cal Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility model, if it is assumed
that probabilities (and, a fortiori, beliefs) are objectively determined, or, in-
stead, the Savage subjective expected utility model, if beliefs (and the induced
probabilities) are believed to be subjective. In this note, we consider a hypoth-
esis about behavior under uncertainty, in a particular context, put forward by
Joseph Stiglitz [6], and consider how it might best be rationalized within choice
theory as it is currently conceived.
Consider, then, the following argument by Stiglitz, that appeared in the
influential policy journal, Foreign Aﬀairs. He comments on the fact that in
recent times mean income has risen in the United States, while median income
has actually fallen. He continues: “Consider the following thought experiment:
If you could choose which country to live in but would be assigned an income
randomly from within that country’s income distribution, would you choose the
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country with the highest GDP per capita? No. More relevant to that decision
is median income . . . As the income distribution becomes increasingly skewed,
with an increasing share of the wealth and income in the hands of those at
the top, the median falls further and further below the mean. That is why,
even as per capita GDP has been increasing in the United States, U.S. median
household income has actually been falling.”
This rich quotation from Stiglitz contains, inter alia, an assertion about
the evolution of the shape of the income distribution in the United States:
whether this is accurate or not is an empirical question, that Dehejia and Marcel
Voia [3] take up elsewhere. More relevant for our purpose, Stiglitz seems to be
suggesting that, when faced with a choice over a set of income distributions that
are rightward skewed, a (presumably) risk-averse individual would do better
to pick the one with the highest median, not the highest mean. This would
be, presumably, because the mean, in some sense, overestimates the “true”
centre of the data, compared to the median. (The mean would, presumably,
underestimate, in this sense, if the distribution were leftward skewed.) This
would seem to accord with common sense. After all, a few very rich individuals
raise US mean income, but do nothing to the median: so it is surely sensible
to imagine that you are going to end up somewhere around the median, and
discount the eﬀect that Bill Gates and his ilk have upon the mean.
The first and most obvious question to ask is, how is one to understand this
assertion? It can be read, at one level, as a claim about a “rule of thumb”
behavior that an individual, either who is not fully rational, or who is operating
under conditions of extreme uncertainty, will, or should follow: if “will”, then it
is an empirical claim; if “should”, then a normative assertion. This would cer-
tainly be a legitimate reading, and could, if one takes the former interpretation,
give rise to a research agenda within experimental, or behavioral, economics,
to determine if individuals do, indeed, behave this way, under such conditions.
Studying the behavior of putative migrants, choosing between two or more po-
tential locations, would be the most natural application, although one could
just as easily look at applications within, for instance, finance, such as portfolio
choice, or, to take another example, occupation choice within labor economics.
(This “rule of thumb” approach is pursued further in Dehejia [2].)
We will note, in passing, that there is also a more abstract, indeed philo-
sophical, interpretation to the situation just described, if one takes the claim as
a normative one. One can imagine, not a putative migrant, but a rational agent,
behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, deciding on what sort of society he would
like to live in. The only modification is that there would be now, not a finite,
but a (hopefully countably) infinite number of distributions to consider, and the
choice of a particular distribution represents, not the choice of a location where
one would like to migrate, but the shape of a just society to which one wishes
to belong. John Rawls’ [5] celebrated investigation along these lines yielded
the “maximin” rule: society should maximize the well-being of its least-well oﬀ
member. One could imagine constructing a neo-Rawslian, call it Stiglitzian,
political theory in which the chosen rule is to maximize the well-being of the
median individual in society. We will not pursue these philosophical reflections
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further in this paper.
Rather than pursuing either of the two avenues just noted, instead, we
shall consider whether, and how, one might rationalize the Stiglitz intuition
of median-maximizing behavior within contemporary choice theory. We see two
potential approaches. The first is to restrict ourselves to the VNM approach. In
this approach, it is known that a risk-averse individual, given a choice between
two lotteries, will pick the one that exhibits second-order stochastic dominance
over the other. (This is to leave aside the prior result, that any expected utility
maximizer, risk averse or not, will prefer a lottery that first-order stochasti-
cally dominates another.) However, in general, there is no reason to expect
that second-order stochastic dominance will be equivalent to a higher median,
or vice-versa. The problem then reduces to finding restrictions on the utility
function, or on the shape of distributions, to generate the result than a risk-
averse expected utility maximizer will pick the highest median. No such general
results are available, which takes us to our second approach, the one that we
pursue here.
Our second approach is to move beyond the VNM model, and consider more
general non-expected utility theory approaches to the choice-theoretic prob-
lem under uncertainty. In the next section, we shall formalize the problem, in
a non-expected utility framework, and, using this, demonstrate that median-
maximizing behavior can be rational. The final section oﬀers some concluding
observations.
2 The Main Result
We begin with some preliminaries. Let X ⊂ R1+ be the set of outcomes. Define
lottery Q as follows
Q = (x1, q1;x2, q2; . . . ;xn, qn)
where xi ∈ X , qi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and
nP
i=1
qi = 1
for n = 1, 2, . . . .
Denote D (X ) the set of lotteries having finite support. For each lottery
Q ∈ D (X ), define the median mQ of Q by
Pr (XQ ≤ mQ) ≥
1
2
and Pr (XQ ≥ mQ) ≥
1
2
. (1)
It is noted that the solutions to above two inequalities may not be unique. If
so, we assume the median mQ of Q is the minimum of the solutions to the two
inequalities (1).
Definition 1 Given preferences º on D (X ), say an agent is an expected utility
maximizer if there exists utility index u : X −→ R1 such that
Q º P ⇐⇒
nP
i=1
u (xi) qi ≥
nP
i=1
u (xi) pi.
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Question 2 Suppose one agent has the following preferences
Q º P ⇐⇒ mQ ≥ mP . (2)
Is the agent an expected utility maximizer?
Unfortunately, as noted in our introduction, the answer is “no” in general.
The VNM model is linear in probability. Moreover, it specifies a particular
functional form,
U (Q) =
nP
i=1
u (xi) qi. (3)
However, the particular functional form is not important for the underlying
choice problem; the key issue is if the agent makes decision based on probabili-
ties.
To overcome this diﬃculty with the VNM framework, Machina and Schmei-
dler [4] introduce the following probabilistic sophistication model.
Some further notions are required. A probability distribution P = (x1, p1; ...;
xm, pm) is said to first-order stochastically dominate Q = (y1, q1; ...; yn, qn)
over the outcome set X ifX
{i:xi≤x}
pi ≤
X
{j:yj≤x}
qj for all x ∈ X .
Use the term strict dominance if the above holds with strict inequality for some
x ∈ X .
Say that V is monotonic (with respect to stochastic dominance) if
V (P )(>) ≥ V (Q)
whenever P (strictly) stochastically dominates Q, P and Q in dom(V ).
Given a real-valued function V defined on a mixture subspace dom(V ) of
D(X ), say that V is mixture continuous if for any distributions P , Q and R in
dom(V ), the sets
{λ ∈ [0, 1] : V (λP + (1− λ)Q) ≥ V (R)} and
{λ ∈ [0, 1] : V (λP + (1− λ)Q) ≤ V (R)}
are closed.
Definition 3 Given preferences º on D (X ), say an agent is probabilistically
sophisticated if there exists a mixture continuous and monotonic function V :
D (X ) −→ R1 such that
Q º P ⇐⇒ V (Q) ≥ V (P ) .
Roughly speaking, no stand is taken on the functional form of V , apart from
monotonicity and mixture continuity, thus capturing primarily the decision-
maker’s reliance on probabilities for the evaluation of lotteries. VNM expected
utility is merely one example, albeit an important one, in which V is an expected
utility function on lotteries D(X ) and thus U has the familiar form (3).
Next, we ask
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Question 4 Suppose an agent has the following preferences defined in (2). Is
the agent probabilistically sophisticated?
Fortunately, the answer is “yes.” The reasons are the following:
For any Q = (x1, q1;x2, q2; . . . ;xn, qn) ∈ D (X ) , define
V (Q) = argmin
m
nP
i=1
|xi −m| qi. (4)
It is well known (see, for example, [1]) that V (Q) = mQ. To prove that the
preference relation º defined in (2) to be probabilistically sophisticated, we only
need to prove V defined in (4) to be mixture continuous and monotonic.
Suppose that P = (x1, p1; ...; xm, pm) first-order stochastically dominates
Q = (y1, q1; ...; yn, qn) over the outcome set X . That is,X
{i:xi≤x}
pi ≤
X
{j:yj≤x}
qj for all x ∈ X .
Accordingly, mQ ≤ mP .
Next, we prove V is also mixture continuous. Without loss of generality,
assume both Q and P have the same support. Thus,
V (λQ+ (1− λ)P ) = argmin
m
nP
i=1
|xi −m| (λqi + (1− λ) pi) .
For given Q and P in D (X ) and λ ∈ [0, 1], define
F (m) =
nP
i=1
|xi −m| (λqi + (1− λ) pi) .
Under the assumption made at the beginning, function F is continuous inm and
F (m) has a unique minimum m (λ). By the maximum theorem (see, for exam-
ple, [7]), the unique minimum m (λ) = V (λQ+ (1− λ)P ) is continuous in λ.
Thus, V is mixture continuous. As a result, º defined in (2) is probabilistically
sophisticated.
3 Concluding Remarks
In this note, we have considered a hypothesis of Joseph Stiglitz [6], arguing
that, under certain, perhaps realistic, conditions, an agent may follow median-
maximizing behavior. As is well known, such behavior is not generally optimal
in the classical VNM framework. Our contribution is to demonstrate that it is
possible to provide a firm choice-theoretic foundation for the Stiglitz hypothesis
if we move beyond the restrictive VNM framework and consider the more general
model of probabilistic sophistication of Machina-Schmeidler [4]. We prove that,
with a particular functional form for the utility function in this framework,
median-maximizing behavior emerges as the optimal choice rule.
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We conclude with some open questions and remaining topics for research.
First, while we have provided a formal rationale for the Stiglitz hypothesis, it
might fairly be asked whether this matches the intuition of the type of problem
that he described. An alternative approach would be to consider his hypothesis
one about non-strictly-rational “rule of thumb” behavior, and to explore to what
extent such behavior might, or might not match, what is known to be optimal
in diﬀerent theoretical frameworks. A tentative step in this direction is taken
by Dehejia [2], who demonstrates that, at least within a particular application,
that is, comparing income distributions in Canada and the United States over
diﬀerent years, an agent following a median-maximizing rule of thumb would,
in fact, be picking the income distribution that exhibits second-order stochastic
dominance, that is, it happens to coincide with the optimal choice of a risk-
averse VNM expected utility maximizer.
A remaining question for future research is whether a rational agent, operat-
ing under conditions of extreme uncertainty, for instance, having knowledge only
of summary statistics such as the mean, median, and mode, and with limited
information about the shape of the distributions, might resort to a median-
maximizing rule as an “approximation” to what would be optimal.
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